(;GM[1]FF[4]SZ[19]AP[SmartGo:3.1.4]CA[shift_jis]
PW[AlphaGo]
PB[AlphaGo]
EV[AlphaGo selfplay]RO[22]
KM[7.5]
RE[B+R]
RU[Chinese]MU[1];B[pd];W[dd];B[pq];W[cp];B[ep];W[qo];B[np];W[eq];B[fq];W[dq]
;B[fp];W[cn];B[qk];W[jq]
C[We have already seen this position in game 11 of this series. In that game Black's next move was played at A. ]
LB[fm:A]
(;B[qp]
(;W[lq]
C[15 and 16 could be called miai, and it would be bad for White to extend from the marked stone (see var).]
TR[qo];B[em]
C[With the order of Black's moves 15 and 17 changed, this is still very similar to game 11 of this series. ]
;W[qc]LB[nr:A][nc:B]
C[With 18, White could have played at A for a relatively peaceful game, or a kakari at B is another option for White. AG played the3-3 invasion, ]
;B[qd];W[pc];B[od];W[nb]
(;B[ok]
C[Black 23 reinforces the core of Black's moyo, and is an important point. Another idea might be to expand the moyo (see var). ]
;W[mc]LB[md:A][ln:B]
C[Playing at 24 or at A is one way for White to reduce Black's potential in the center while playing a move towards the upper side. Another option would be for White to play at B to prevent Black from spreading into the center. ]
;B[kp];W[rp];B[rq];W[lp]
(;B[mn]
C[Black's idea here is to continue putting pressure on White's group while expanding Black's moyo as much as possible. Covering on the 5th line makes it easy for White to live (see var). ]
;W[ko];B[jp]LB[kq:A][lo:B]
C[The fight becomes tactically complicated as Black makes the double threat of pushing through at A or cutting at B. ]
;W[nq]LB[op:A][oq:B]
C[White 32 is a probe that threatens to break into Black's right side and asks if Black will answer at A or B, and White's following move will depend on that. ]
(;B[mp]
C[bumping at 33 was not the expected move, so I added two variations for Black's other choices. ]
;W[pp];B[qq];W[oq];B[op]
(;W[ip]
C[With 38, White seems to have decided to just make a living shape on the side and give the center to Black. The hanging connection was also an option (see var). ]
;B[jo];W[kq];B[lo];W[hq];B[kn];W[io];B[in];W[hn];B[im]
(;W[pj]
C[White switches to the right side. I would have continued on the left with what looks like a strong attack (see var). ]
;B[pk];W[qj];B[rc];W[rb]
(;B[oj]
C[Black 53 seems to me to be slow, and I would suggest the variation. ];W[ph]
;B[og];W[oh];B[nh]
(;W[ng]
C[Cutting at 58 leads to a fight with White's weak group floating around next to a very strong Black position on the lower side. I would prefer to go for a life on the right side (see var). ]
;B[of];W[ni];B[mh];W[oi];B[rk]
C[Playing at 63, Black reduces White to one eye on the right side. ];W[mi]
;B[lh];W[li];B[kh];W[rj];B[rg]
C[With Black 69 it would have been simpler to play at A, reducing White to only one eye. In the game White will have a potential ko for life. The merit of 69 is that it gains more territory for Black compared to the move at A. This will be clarified with a var at 72.]
LB[qg:A];W[qg];B[qf]
(;W[ki]
C[Obviously the fight will continue in the center, but it is important to recognize that White has a potential ko on the right side (see var). ]
;B[ji];W[jj];B[ij];W[jh];B[ii];W[jk];B[lk];W[kg];B[jg];W[ih];B[lg];W[ik]
;B[gj];W[hm]
(;B[fk]TR[em]
C[With 87 Black is more interested in connecting to the marked group, and is going to allow White's group to escape (see var). ]
;W[mk];B[ll];W[jm];B[jn];W[hk];B[gh];W[hj];B[hi];W[ml]
C[White 96 prevents the cut at A. ]LB[kj:A];B[cf];W[df];B[dg];W[gk];B[fj]
;W[ce];B[ef];W[de];B[bf];W[eg];B[dh];W[fc]
C[This is a case in which White's play at 108 is much more important than the joseki move at A. ]
LB[ff:A];B[cl];W[dm]
C[White threatens to cut Black off at A. ]LB[en:A];B[do]
C[Black peeps once to erase the threat at A. ]LB[en:A];W[bm]
C[White prevents Black pushing through at A while reducing Black's side territory. ]
LB[co:A];B[dl];W[pr];B[ir]
(;W[po]TR[ir]
C[The marked Black move was a well timed peep that will force White to connect and thus reduce White's territory (see var). White connects once at 116 with sente before answering the threat. ]
;B[ro];W[iq]LB[ir:A][iq:B][hr:C]
C[The exchange of A for B gave Black a potential connection at C, so that was a good exchange for Black. There is some trouble brewing on the right side.]
;B[cc];W[rn];B[sp];W[be];B[eb];W[fb];B[ec];W[fd];B[bd];W[ae];B[bb]
C[Black is alive in the corner. It might seem natural to think that the game might settle down to a calm endgame now, with White playing something like A to surround the upper side, and also one might assume that the lower right area will just become Black's territory. The territory is fairly well balanced. ]
LB[jd:A];W[sm]LB[so:A][sk:B]
C[White 130 is an annoying move that looks to start a ko at A, and also shows the connection underneath at B, as well as some more aggressive moves that involve a potential semeai between the two marked groups. It is difficult to calculate whether White 130 will turn out to be brilliant or disasterous, as the right side will become a ko that will take more than 100 moves to finish, and in the immediate future White is about to lose some points on the upper side. ]
TR[ok][qk:rk][rn][po:pp][qo];B[id]
C[Black 131 is an important move that attacks White in the upper left. ]
;W[ff];B[ge];W[hf]LB[hh:A][kf:B]
C[White 134 is a slippery counter-attack, with a forcing move at A to secure the connection and various squeezing tactics in the center, with the White extension at B being the mainline squeeze. ]
;B[ig]TR[ih:jh]
C[Black simply captures the marked cutting stones. This solid move steengthens all of the neighboring Black groups to reduce White's potential ko threats for the pending ko on the right side, while Black is still putting pressure on White's group in the upper left. ]
;W[he];B[kd];W[je];B[jd];W[ea];B[db];W[fg]LB[ef:A][ge:B][id:C]
C[Now the White group is alive, with one eye at A and another at B. In the sequence staring with Black C, Black has reduced White's potential territory on the upper side with tempo, so this was a local success for Black. ]
(;B[mm]TR[oj:ok][pk]
C[Black 143 secures two eyes for Black, and for the time being, the marked stones are connected to Black's group in the center. Cutting on the 3rd line with this move is bad for Black (see var). ]
;W[qr]LB[qn:A][so:B]
C[If Black cuts at A now, it will be a ko at B. ];B[rr];W[pm]LB[ol:A][sk:B]
C[White 146 makes miai of A and B. ]
(;B[qn];W[qm];B[rl];W[ol];B[rm]
(;W[pn]
C[White cannot avoid the semeai (see var). ];B[nl];W[nk];B[nm]
(;W[so]
C[Wite cannot win the semeai (see var), so this ko is forced. ]
(;B[sn]
C[This is a ko, because Black cannot connect at A (see var). ]LB[rp:A];W[en]
;B[co];W[bo];B[dn];W[so]
C[The weaker player would connect at A without thinking, However, there is a reason for White to want to leave it. After all, we are in the middle of a ko, and ideally, White would like to be able to use A as a ko threat. However, I am thinking that capturing the ko at 162 must have been White's losing move because the ko is not direct and Black capturing at A is a big move. ]
LB[cm:A];B[cm]LB[rp:A][il:B][kj:C]TR[oj:ok][pk:rk][rl:rm]
C[Black 163 was a huge move. White still has to fight the ko at A. If the marked Black group can somehow survive, there is a threatened cut with Black B forcing thanks to the capture at 163, and then Black C. This added value gives Black an advantage now.  ]
;W[rp];B[hc];W[gd];B[ro];W[lf];B[kf];W[rp];B[ed];W[ee];B[ro];W[mg];B[kg]
;W[rp];B[gg];W[gf];B[ro];W[sn];B[sl];W[rp];B[oc];W[ob];B[ro];W[qn];B[om]
TR[ol]
C[This is a one-step yoseko favoring White, but White does not have time to save the marked cutting stone. ]
;W[rp];B[nj];W[re];B[rf]
(;W[kk]
C[White needs to protect at 192 to maintain a connection (see var). ];B[ro]
;W[rd];B[md];W[le];B[ke];W[ld];B[lc];W[rp];B[sr]
C[Technically, Black 201 is not really a good move, in that it changes a one-step approach ko into a ko in which Black still needs an extra approach move to get to a real ko, but White has some extra resilience with a two-step ko in the process. In this board position White can not make use of this seeming mistake, as Black has an advantage in the number of ko threats, and White will eventually end up connecting at A to revert to a on-e step ko. ]
LB[ro:A];W[sq];B[fr];W[bn];B[sp];W[lb];B[kc];W[sq];B[cr];W[bq];B[sp];W[nd]
;B[nc];W[me];B[ne];W[sq];B[go];W[ho];B[sp];W[ro];B[pl];W[rs];B[mq];W[mr]
;B[oo]
C[Black still needs one more move at A to get a direct ko. ]LB[on:A];W[sq]
;B[nr];W[or];B[sp];W[mb];B[mf];W[sq];B[ns];W[ms];B[sp];W[bl];B[on];W[sq]
;B[gl];W[hl];B[sp];W[nf];B[mf];W[sq];B[pb];W[sc];B[sp];W[ac];B[ql];W[ad]
LB[jd:A][qn:B][nf:C][dm:D][bl:E]
C[At move 129 of this game I suggested that White could play at A to surround the upper side, and that Black might secure the area around B, and that it would then go on to be a close game. It took 120 moves to resolve the complications that arised from White's move at 130. Black erased White's area at A, and got extra profit around B, C and D. White captured the upper left corner for more than 25 points and also got the big move at E. This is also a close game, so I can say the trade was about even. ]
;B[dr];W[cj];B[ci];W[bj];B[dj];W[md];B[hr];W[jr];B[cq];W[dp];B[ck];W[bk]
;B[er];W[bp];B[qh];W[fm];B[fn];W[gn];B[fo];W[mj];B[bh];W[is];B[gr];W[el]
;B[eo];W[fl];B[ek];W[gm];B[kb];W[pg];B[ri];W[sj];B[gb];W[la];B[br];W[pf]
;B[qe];W[fa];B[ha];W[si];B[hs];W[js];B[aq];W[ap];B[kl];W[jl];B[ar];W[ka]
;B[ja];W[sh];B[rh];W[sf];B[bi];W[sg];B[oe];W[hg];B[hh];W[qs];B[lj];W[ai]
;B[kj];W[km];B[lm]
(;W[hd]
C[This is where White needed to add a stone to the right side, so I added a variation to show that Black wins by half of a point. ]
;B[qb]LB[rc:A][pi:B][pe:C][se:D]
C[White resigned. If White connects at A, Black can play in the order of B, C, and D to capture the White group. ]
)
(;W[se];B[ah];W[aj];B[ie];W[fh];B[fi];W[eh];B[ei];W[af];B[ag];W[if];B[jf]
;W[hd];B[gc];W[ga];B[ib]
C[B+0.75stones (0.5pts)]))
(;W[sq];B[il];W[fm];B[kj];W[lj];B[kk];W[lm];B[kl]TR[li:oi]
C[The marked group dies. ]))
(;B[rp];W[sn];B[rs];W[sr];B[sl];W[qn];B[om];W[sq];B[or];W[nr];B[on];W[os]
C[White wins the semeai. ]))
(;W[sn];B[so];W[nj];B[sl];W[qn];B[om];W[pl];B[on]
C[Black wins by one move. ]))
(;W[nk];B[sn]TR[po:pp][qo]LB[nk:A][sn:B]
C[If White backs off at A, Black can connect with territory at B, and Black has the option to capture the marked three stones later. Black is ahead. ]
))
(;B[nl];W[sk];B[rl];W[sl];B[rm];W[sn];B[so];W[qm]LB[nl:A][sk:B]
C[If Black protects at A, White can connect underneath at B, and with the forcing hane at C White has erased most of Black's potential territory in the area. White has a small lead. ]
))
(;B[qn];W[qm];B[pn];W[pm];B[on];W[ol];B[sj];W[si];B[sk];W[rh];B[nl];W[nk]
;B[nm];W[bl]LB[qn:A][rh:B][bl:C]
C[Black can cut at A to capture three stones and then get a seki on the right, but is losing too much in the precess as White plays the big move at B. White has sente to play at C, and White is ahead in territory. ]
))
(;W[hr];B[mq];W[mr];B[iq];W[or];B[ho];W[hp];B[go]LB[hr:A][iq:B][lr:C]
C[If White covers at A, Black's cut at B threatens the cut at C. Black can cut off the marked White group with this sequence. ]
TR[ki][jj]))
(;B[hk];W[hl];B[il];W[gk];B[hj];W[fj]LB[hk:A][rh:B]TR[em][ep:fp][fq]
C[If Black plays at A to surround the White group, White will be able to cut off the marked Black group, and probably will be able to capture it on a large scale. One must remember that White has a ko at A, so this is good for White. ]
))
(;W[rh];B[re];W[sg];B[rf];W[qi];B[pg];W[sj]LB[qh:A][re:B][sb:C]
C[White can get a ko at A for two eyes. In the process Black could play at B, setting up the big move at C next. White still has some room to escape in the center, so his whole variation is not a mainline event that will happen immediately, but it will influence how the players handle the fight in the center. Black seems to be saying that since the one-sided ko will be painful for White anyway, that Black's profit with B and C is a good trade for allowing White this potential. ]
))
(;W[pg];B[of];W[rk];B[rl];W[rg]LB[rj:A][re:B][ng:C]
C[In this var White simply lives on the side. Connecting at A and peeping at B are miai to give White a living shape. Black has a remaining weakness at C, and this slightly favors White. ]
))
(;B[oh];W[qg];B[pg];W[rf];B[qh];W[rh];B[qf];W[rg];B[rj];W[ri];B[rk];W[pf]
;B[of];W[rd];B[re];W[sc]LB[oh:A]
C[If Black encloses with A, White will not die, but will be forced into a painful life. Black gets some outide influence and this is about even. ]
))
(;W[hm];B[hl];W[gl];B[gm];W[gn];B[fm];W[gk];B[ek];W[dl];B[fk];W[il];B[hk]
;W[gj];B[ei];W[ij]
C[White could have attacked immediately at A. If Black moves out to save the group on the left, White will continue to attack, and this will make it relatively easy for White to reduce Black's moyo on the right. ]
))
(;W[ln];B[mo];W[lo];B[kq];W[kr];B[jr];W[po]LB[mq:A][iq:B][mm:C][ro:D]
C[This variation looks like trouble for Black. White A threatens to extend at B next, so if we assume that point to be forcing for White, then C and D are miai in this position. C gives White a powerful squeeze from the center, and D gives White an advantageous semeai in the corner. ]
))
(;B[op];W[iq];B[lo];W[kn]
C[If Black pulls back at A, White will have some extra eyespace on the side in this fight ]
LB[op:A])
(;B[oq];W[iq];B[lo];W[mo];B[ln];W[no]LB[oq:A][lo:B]
C[If Black plays at A, then it becomes difficult for Black to cut at B when White has the sequence shown here. ]
))
(;B[lo];W[mo];B[mp];W[ko];B[ln];W[jo];B[km];W[mf]))
(;B[lo];W[jo];B[km];W[ok]
C[If Black continues to expand the moyo, White will eventually come in at A, and it will be difficult for Black to kill this invasion. ]
LB[ok:A]))
(;W[po];B[lq];W[jo];B[fm]))
(;B[jo];W[lq];B[kp];W[kq];B[dp];W[cq];B[ip];W[nr]))

